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History and the Boundaries of Legality: Historical Evidence at the ECCC 
Andrew Mamo 
 
  The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) are marked by the 
amount of time that has elapsed between the fall of Democratic Kampuchea in 1979 and the 
creation of the tribunal. Does this passage of time matter? There are obvious practical reasons 
why it does: suspects die, witnesses die or have their memories fade, documents are lost and 
found, theories of accountability gain or lose currency within the broader public. And yet, 
formally, the mechanisms of criminal justice continue to operate despite the intervening years. 
The narrow jurisdiction limits the court’s attention to the events of 1975–1979, and potential 
evidence must meet legal requirements of relevance in order to be admissible. Beyond the 
immediate questions of the quality of the evidence, does history matter? Should it? 
  One answer is that this history is largely irrelevant to the legal questions at issue. In this 
view, the events of Democratic Kampuchea from 1975–1979 can be tried without reference to 
the events of the intervening years. The facts relating to the crimes stand on their own, and the 
legal theories relate strictly to those facts and events. This approach would find nothing in 
particular to distinguish the operations of the ECCC from those of any other tribunal, save for the 
unfortunate problem of mortality and imperfect memory. 
  Another possible (and plausible) answer is that the extralegal influence of history is 
comparable in kind to the extralegal influence of political interference — a matter of obvious and 
sustained concern at the ECCC. In this theory, advanced by several of the defense counsel, the 
evidence from 1975–1979 must be read in light of intervening events, which include the years of 
Vietnamese occupation, the collection of documentary evidence as part of an attempt to hold 
Khmer Rouge leaders accountable, and the stranglehold that the Heng Samrin–Hun Sen line of 2 
 
leadership has had over Cambodian political life. This historical gloss suggests the need for 
skepticism in reading evidence, and may even raise the question of what has been omitted 
(intentionally or unintentionally) from the documentary record. In this telling, the influence of 
history is effectively the accumulation of years of political interference, culminating in the well-
known suspicions of interference on the Cambodian side of the court. 
  I argue for a third understanding of the role of history, which neither reads it out through 
a single-minded focus on the face of the evidence, nor vests it with the power of thorough 
corruption. I argue instead that an understanding of the historical context of the court and of the 
evidence that is presented before it reframes the basic relationship between the court and 
Cambodian society. For, despite the differences between the two previous accountings of history, 
both insist on maintaining a strict boundary between the legal procedure of the court and the 
extralegal influences of society—the first version, in order to insist that the court can repel these 
influences; the second version, in order to insist that the court cannot.
1 But this insistence on 
absolutism ignores the facts that the court is itself an actor in the drama of Cambodian history, a 
product of both domestic and international politics, and that just as attempts to determine 
accountability in civil society occur in the shadow of the law, so too are attempts to ground 
judicial fact-finding in robust historical accounts inevitably shaped by a wider historical 
discourse. 
  Crucially, this understanding is not an attempt to view law as the continuation of politics 
by other means.
2 It is, rather, a pragmatic recognition that the imperfections of the international 
                                                 
1 Jenia Turner distinguishes between the legal and political modes of international criminal trials. However, my 
argument is that both must be considered simultaneously in these contexts, because both are present simultaneously. 
Any given issue may fall on one side or the other, but the fundamental contention is that the legal issues are tied to a 
political context, and the political questions are cabined by the legal form. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense 
Perspectives on Law and Politics in International Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 529, 534 (2008). 
2 Perhaps more appropriate than the Clausewitzian aphorism to which this refers is Foucault’s inversion, “politics is 
the continuation of war by other means,” in light of the theory advanced by Nuon Chea defense attorney Jasper 3 
 
legal order do, in fact, exist, and do, in fact, affect the structure and operations of international 
tribunals. History roots the idealized space of legal process in the messy soil from which real, 
extant, tribunals grow. Frank acknowledgement of historical complexity calls attention to the 
construction of the boundary that attempts to protect the sanctity of the legal process from the 
brute power politics of the social world. I suggest that it is this boundary that deserves our 
scrutiny and the concomitant attempt to purify law of history. To the extent that we believe it 
important to defend the formalities and protections of legal process from extralegal factors,
3 we 
must appreciate that this separation does not occur naturally, but must be built. Far from leading 
to the collapse of law into politics, history provides the tools with which to create legal spaces 
where they are not yet to be found. It also clarifies the limits of what law can achieve: the 
boundary not only keeps law free from undue political or social influences, but also protects the 
possibility of public discourse from being unduly constrained by legal norms. 
  I suggest that this issue is common to all international criminal law. But the peculiar 
context of the ECCC heightens the problem beyond what is experienced at the ICTY, or the 
ICTR, or the ICC. It magnifies the problems in a way that makes them easier to analyze and 
diagnose. 
  This paper proceeds in six parts. The first part builds the argument that the legal validity 
of the court’s judgment depends (at least in part) on leaving open the historical context, and that 
                                                                                                                                                           
Pauw that Case 002 represents the final stage of the internecine struggles of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
that have been marked by the revised date of the party’s origins, the purge of the Eastern Zone, and the Vietnamese 
backing of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED: LECTURES 
AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1975–1976 15 (David Macey trans., 1997). For more on Pauw’s theory, see note 48, 
infra. 
3 As Paul Gewirtz puts it, “Maintaining the boundary between the courtroom and ordinary life is a central part of 
what legal process is all about. Distinctive legal rules of procedure, jurisdiction, and evidence insist upon and define 
law’s autonomous character — indeed, constitute the very basis of a court’s authority. The mob may have their faces 
pressed hard against the courthouse windows, but the achievement of the trial is to keep those forces at bay, or at last 
to transmute their energy into a stylized formal ritual of proof and judgment.” See Paul Gewirtz, Victims and 
Voyeurs: Two Narrative Problems at the Criminal Trial, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 
135 (Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). 4 
 
the court’s broadly historical function is tied to the quality and scope of its narrowly legal work. 
The boundary must be recognized, but so too must it be permeable. The second part addresses 
how the structure of the court has been influenced by the past half century of Cambodian wars 
and the politics of writing Cambodian history. The court did not emerge organically out of the 
fabric of Cambodian society, but rather represented a highly contested settlement among the 
United States, the United Nations, and the Cambodian government that reflected contingent 
historical events around the turn of the millennium. The third part addresses the problems facing 
the court in its attempts to define the courtroom as a space of law, independent of the vicissitudes 
of Cambodian politics. These systemic problems influence how the court must cabin the role of 
non-legal actors who engage with it. The fourth part directly addresses the nature of the 
boundary by examining how the parties in the court interact with historical experts and with the 
extensive documentation that has been gathered by archivists, activists, and scholars over the 
years. The fifth part addresses the boundary from the other side: from efforts by civil society to 
mobilize the legal machinery to serve non-legal ends of reconciliation and truth.
4 It asks what the 
court’s findings of fact mean for the writing of Cambodian history, and how attempts to address 
the past should make use of the court record. If law tries to operationalize history and history 
tries to problematize law, is there a way to respect each on its own terms? Are the procedural 
protections of the criminal law compatible with the goals of transitional justice? Finding the 
approaches of both the process-oriented and the ends-oriented camps lacking, the conclusion 
suggests an alternative that acknowledges this fundamental tension, and examines how it might 
mitigate some of the quandaries faced by the ECCC. 
                                                 
4 These could, of course, be described as “internal” to the law; reconciliation and truth are, after all, frequently 
invoked as the goals to which legal processes are directed. I pull them out, however, to contrast a process-oriented 
legal approach with goal-directed approaches that care less about law as the vehicle for achieving them, and care 
more for heterodox means that may be less regular than a legal system wishes to tolerate. See also note 129, infra. 5 
 
I.  “Boundary Work” in the Construction of International Criminal Tribunals 
  The work of drawing boundaries is fundamental to many specialized professions in 
defining the domain of professional expertise.
5 Boundaries function to mark off areas of 
expertise and to protect the workings of expert judgment from both extraneous matters and from 
the interventions of outsiders.
6 In developed legal systems, the work involved in boundary 
drawing is almost invisible; the lines demarcating the law are well-defined and only subject to 
occasional refinements. In less-developed systems, however, the work of boundary drawing is 
more obvious — both in establishing the space and in defending it against encroachment.
7 The 
integrity of the boundary is essential because the workings of the law must meet the internal 
standards that the profession requires, and because the findings of the law must be respected as 
law beyond the boundary.
8 
  The interplay between the internal functioning and validity of the law, on the one hand, 
and the external functioning and validity of the law, on the other, are mutually reinforcing; legal 
                                                 
5 See generally ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS (1988). Abbott defines the problem of professional 
demarcation in terms of function, rather than in terms of analytic distinctions. Boundary drawing between the 
“contested jurisdictions” of the professions plays a particularly important role in his account. 
6 While the sociology of professions has a rich literature, I will draw upon models developed in the context of the 
sociology of the scientific professions, but which I believe are also applicable in the context of law. The basis of this 
parallel is that both professions distinguish the specialized reasoning of its practitioners from lay social thought. On 
the construction of a specialized interior space for science in the context of political thought in 17
th Century England, 
see STEVEN SHAPIN AND SIMON SCHAFFER, LEVIATHAN AND THE AIR-PUMP (1985). 
7 There is an additional sense in which boundaries are of central importance to the law: in defining jurisdictions. See 
Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha Merrill Umphrey, Where (or What) Is the Place of Law? An 
Introduction, in THE PLACE OF LAW 1, 2 (Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha Merrill Umphrey eds., 2003) 
(“The study of jurisdiction inevitably invites inquiry into the nature of legal boundaries, about what is inside and 
outside of law. . . . But the very act of drawing sharp boundaries involves an imagination of an outside, a place from 
which law is constitutively absent. Law is a set of social institutions and practices constructed on the basis of 
imaginings of a place beyond law’s boundaries.”). These jurisdictional boundaries are crucially important at the 
ECCC as well: the narrow temporal jurisdiction sets sharp limits on how issues are contextualized. The facts at issue 
in the trial are primarily contested on this more abstract level and are contrasted with the extra-legal space beyond 
the courtroom. See the discussion of Koskenniemi, at note 16, infra. 
8 See generally Danny Priel, The Boundaries of Law and the Purpose of Legal Philosophy, 27 LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 643 (2008). Priel challenges the distinction between “laws” and “non-laws,” urging instead a shift to 
asking about how law is situated within political and moral thought. See id. at 690–694. 6 
 
findings carry weight because they meet the highest standards of the profession, and those 
standards matter because they serve socially valuable ends.
9 
  But the boundary is not fixed. The hard questions exist in the no-man’s land that 
surrounds it, and the work of positioning issues on one side or the other continually reconstitutes 
the boundary.
10 Transitional justice is largely about identifying problems that are ripe for legal 
resolution while simultaneously encouraging the development of a democratic and open public 
sphere, placing it squarely at the boundary. I suggest that questions concerning the scope of 
prosecutions in international criminal law are particularly hard, due to the inherently political 
nature of mass atrocities and transitional governments.
11 
  The specific problems facing the ECCC are more complicated still; it is precisely because 
the court is operating within a space in which non-legal actors, including scholars and politicians, 
have already engaged in fact-finding and determinations of accountability that it must define 
itself against the extralegal work that has gone on. What distinguishes the Cambodian context is 
that the passage of time has allowed for this scholarship to mature beyond its earliest offerings, 
leading to the complex fusion of mythology, unexamined assumptions, and rigorous scholarly 
inquiry that attends to the writing of history within a contested political space.
12 The court is 
therefore placed in an interesting historical position: as it generates trial records through a 
judicial process that follows its own set of procedural rules, this record sits alongside the existing 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Paul A. Freund, The Legal Profession, 92 DAEDALUS 689, 700 (1963) (“Yet the legal profession, no less 
than the scientific, functions in a lay society that does, and should, judge its performance. If this judgment is to be 
effective, it must be based on knowledge of the role of the profession and the character of its thinking.”). Roger 
Cotterrell makes a related point when he notes that legal doctrine and sociological understandings of law are 
necessary complements. See Cotterrell, Why Must Legal Ideas be Interpreted Sociologically?, 25 J. OF LAW AND 
SOCIETY 171, 173 (1998). 
10 See Thomas F. Gieryn, Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests 
in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, 48 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 781 (1983). While Gieryn’s 
pioneering article is directed toward scientists in particular, I suggest that the demarcation problem is equally 
pressing in the context of law. 
11 See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS 
VIOLENCE 13 (1998). 
12 See, e.g., DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY (2001). 7 
 
scholarship and debates about the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) era. While the line drawing is 
important, the boundary cannot be impermeable.
13 My argument is neither that this context 
inherently taints the proceedings,
14 nor that it is irrelevant. My argument is rather that the context 
heightens the need for line-drawing and brings into stark relief certain themes in transitional 
justice and on the relationships among law, history, and society in dealing with atrocities. The 
hybrid legal-historical nature of international criminal trials suggests the need to reexamine the 
beliefs about lawfulness and fairness that attach to the maintenance of a firm separation between 
law and history.
15 
Why must the court continue to pay attention to external validity, now that it has been 
created with a defined jurisdiction? Martti Koskenniemi provides a partial answer by describing 
the basic tension between the legal focus on individual responsibility in atrocity crimes and 
structural explanations.
16 The determination of individual responsibility requires a context for 
evidence, and the contestation of context will generally proceed on the level of framing, rather 
than on the level of particular facts.
17 Contesting the frame threatens to turn an atrocity trial into 
a circus (or at the least threatens to bring into focus the actions of the West in destabilizing the 
                                                 
13 This is perhaps the most significant difference from Gieryn’s model. While boundary work in science attempts a 
clean separation between the natural and the social worlds, boundary work in the law requires some translation 
across the boundary. (For work that challenges the possibility of separation, see Latour, infra note 15.) The 
“gatekeeper” analogy in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) may be helpful (as it 
suggests traffic passing through the gate and into the courtroom), but here the translation goes both ways. 
14 This risks entering the once-vituperative debates about whether realism requires nihilism. See, e.g., Joseph 
William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984). I do not intend to re-
engage with these now-stale arguments, except to note that even now there seems to be a presumption that any overt 
discussion of the social context of law threatens to unmoor the legal system. 
15 See BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN (Catherine Porter trans. 1993). Latour’s argument is, at 
bottom, that the distinct categories of “society” and “nature” are generated through the work of “purification” — but 
that the proliferation of “hybrids” that cannot be neatly categorized (such as man-made environmental damage) 
suggests the need for an alternative ontology. My argument translates this into the legal context. 
16 Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, in MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 
12 (2002). 
17 Id. at 14. 8 
 
society in question
18), but preventing the frame from being challenged raises the specter of the 
show trial.
19 The internal operations of the court are not, and cannot be, totally insulated from the 
historical context. The question is not whether courts should be engaged in the process of writing 
history; it is how they should when they are forced to do so. “The engagement of a court with 
‘truth’ and ‘memory’ is thus always an engagement with political antagonism, and nowhere more 
so than in dealing with events of wide-ranging international and moral significance,” he notes.
20 
However, “no matter how much judges may seek to proceed in good faith towards their 
judgments, the context of the trial cannot — unlike the history seminar — be presumed to 
manifest good faith on everyone’s part. This is not a disinterested enquiry by a group of external 
observers but part of the history it seeks to interpret. Much is at stake for the protagonists — that 
is the nature of the trial — and no truth can remain sacred within it.”
21 
It is precisely because atrocity trials are, almost by definition, both politically charged 
and historically sensitive that the internal fairness of the legal process requires openness to 
external discourses.
22 As this paper argues, the real action of an atrocity trial occurs at a level 
beyond bare facts, at the level of narrative and of networks of facts. At the same time, the 
broader social function of the trial depends on both the rigor and fairness of the process and 
whether its results withstand the scrutiny of an interested public.
23 The question then becomes 
                                                 
18 The role of the United States in Cambodia, for example, is incredibly complex: supporting the Lon Nol regime 
against the Khmer Rouge insurgents, then supporting the Khmer Rouge against the Vietnam-backed government, 
and finally, in the 21
st century, leading the call for a tribunal. Similar circumstances surround, for example, the effort 
to bring Klaus Barbie to justice: Barbie had been protected by the United States for his work as an informant in 
Bolivia. See Alice Y. Kaplan, Introduction to ALAIN FINKIELKRAUT, REMEMBERING IN VAIN: THE KLAUS BARBIE 
TRIAL AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY xxx–xxxii (Roxanne Lapidus trans., 1992). Note, too, that Jacques Vergès 
played a starring role in both the Barbie trial and in Case 002 at the ECCC, in which he is on the Khieu Samphan 
defense team. His “rupture” strategy operates at the fault line examined by Koskenniemi. 
19 Koskenniemi, supra note 16, at 14. 
20 Id. at 25. 
21 Id. at 25. 
22 See Minow, supra note 11, at 126 (“It falls to grassroots and international groups of advocates and writers, 
paradoxically, to create demand and an appreciation for the ideal of legal responses to mass atrocity.”) 
23 See id. at 38–46.  9 
 
how the court, through its handling of the historical context, can improve the internal and 
external validity of the proceedings. 
The next two sections trace the creation of the ECCC as a legal space within the 
compromised politics and civil society of Cambodia. While this act of separation erected a 
boundary to protect the sanctified space of the court, the work of boundary drawing did not end 
there. The boundary has been continually reinforced and its precise location tweaked; it remains 
dynamic. The following two sections locate the boundary between the interior space of the court 
and the exterior space of Cambodian history. The two sections after that examine the forces that 
push against that boundary from each side. 
II.  The External Context: The Specters of Democratic Kampuchea Haunting 
Contemporary Cambodian Society 
Negotiations regarding the establishment of a tribunal for Cambodia had occurred for 
years before the ultimate creation of the ECCC. The hybrid form of the tribunal reflects the 
context of these negotiations, which occurred against a backdrop of civil war that directly 
involved the Khmer Rouge. There is no simple way to separate the structure of the tribunal (and 
its rules and the selection of its personnel) from the contingencies of contemporary Cambodian 
history, or from the long attempt to come to terms with that history. 
David Scheffer, the Ambassador for War Crimes at the State Department during the 
Clinton Administration, describes in his memoirs his negotiations with the Cambodian 
government.
24 In 1999, twenty years after the fall of Democratic Kampuchea, the U.N., with 
strong U.S. support, argued for the creation of a Chapter VII international tribunal, as had been 
                                                 
24 See DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 341–405 
(2012). 10 
 
created to deal with the crimes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
25 When Prime Minister Hun Sen 
objected to a full U.N. tribunal, then-Senator John Kerry proposed a hybrid tribunal, with joint 
participation of Cambodian and U.N. staff.
26 But the devil was in the details. Hans Corell, the 
U.N. legal counsel, outlined a hybrid tribunal in which international judges would be in the 
majority, with conviction requiring a simple majority vote; Hun Sen demanded that a majority of 
the judges be Cambodian.
27 Confronted with this stalemate, Scheffer negotiated for a majority-
Cambodian bench with a supermajority requirement for decisions, guaranteeing that neither side 
could reach judgment unilaterally.
28 
In February 2002, confronted with what the U.N. saw as a compromised court structure, 
Hans Corell and Kofi Annan backed away from the negotiations. Corell said: “the United 
Nations has come to the conclusion that the Extraordinary Chambers, as currently envisaged, 
would not guarantee the independence, impartiality, and objectivity that a court established with 
the support of the United Nations must have. . . . [T]he United Nations . . . have decided, with 
regret, to end its participation in this process.”
29 Corell mentioned the likelihood that the tribunal 
would be “unable to produce a final judgment,” in the event that the accused all died before the 
trial’s end.
30 But negotiations resumed, and the Agreement between the United Nations and the 
Royal Government of Cambodia was signed in 2003 and ratified by the Cambodian National 
                                                 
25 See id. at 381. 
26 Id. at 383. 
27 Id. at 384–385. 
28 Id. at 387–388. 
29 Id. at 401–402. 
30 Cambodia: Ieng Sary Death Shows Khmer Rouge Court Failings, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (March 14, 2013), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/14/cambodia-ieng-sary-death-shows-khmer-rouge-court-failings. 11 
 
Assembly in October 2004.
31 In July 2006, the first staffers were sworn in, and the ECCC began 
its work. 
Scheffer was motivated by reasons both legal and personal. The personal reasons include 
his own experience working in Southeast Asia in the late 1970s,
32 as well as the history of 
American involvement in Cambodia; the United States spent years bombing Cambodia during 
the Vietnam War, and later continued to support the rump Khmer Rouge against the Vietnam-
backed government.
33 But the push was also due to the recognition that a robust international 
criminal law had to be able to deal with the atrocities of Democratic Kampuchea.
34 
This process was only possible because of Cambodia’s political situation in the late ’90s, 
as its civil war drew to a close. Ieng Sary was offered amnesty by King Sihanouk in 1996.
35 Pol 
Pot had died in the jungle in 1998, escaping judgment.
36 Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan 
defected to the Cambodian government.
37 Ta Mok was captured in 1999.
38 The changing 
circumstances generated renewed interest in holding trials for the surviving members of the 
Khmer Rouge. 
As a society that is still in transition, the scars of the past half century are in full view and 
inform every attempt to address the current human rights situation of Cambodia. The influence 
                                                 
31 Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution 
under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, June 6, 2003. Available 
at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/Agreement_between_UN_and_RGC.pdf. 
32 See Scheffer, supra note 24, at 342. 
33 See id. at 342 (“a massive atrocity was occurring in my lifetime while the U.S. government largely ignored it. . . . 
I realized that ‘never again’ had been contradicted with profound ambivalence by the international community.”). 
34 As Scheffer admits, “I could not rationalize building the other war crimes tribunals and then ignore a reckoning 
for the Khmer Rouge and their decimation of the Cambodian people. This sometimes did not sit well with major 
civil society groups and U.N. lawyers who were seeking a near-perfect model of justice and were prepared to 
abandon the endeavor, which both sometimes did.” The recognition of these imperfections in the Cambodian model 
of justice are at the heart of the tribunal’s current problems. See id. at 344.  
35 This amnesty was held not to bar Ieng Sary’s prosecution in Case 002. See Decision on Ieng Sary’s Rule 89 
Preliminary Objections (Ne Bis in Idem and Amnesty and Pardon), Trial Chamber, Nov. 3, 2011, paras. 53–55. 
36 See Scheffer, supra note 24, at 359–360. 
37 See id. at 372. 
38 See id. at 379. 12 
 
of history is not only experienced subconsciously (though, in the context of trauma, this is part of 
the equation as well
39); the historical fault lines continue to shape the events of the present day. It 
is precisely because the court is engaged in addressing this history that must be situated within its 
historical context. Because the court’s efforts to explain and test historical evidence are what is at 
issue, the court must be understood as a participant in writing Cambodian history as well as a 
forum for the analysis of this history. The court’s determinations of fact and of law will play a 
significant role in shaping the ongoing efforts to write and define Cambodian history.
40 
A.  History as a Weapon in Cambodian Politics 
This issue is particularly salient in the context of Cambodia, because modern Cambodian 
history has generally been defined by outsiders. One of the claims of the Khmer Rouge was that 
they were allowing the history of Cambodia to be written by Cambodians for the first time.
41 The 
history of Angkor, for example, was a product of the French, who sought to create a usable 
history for their Cambodian colony.
42 The memory of Angkor, which was rejuvenated by the 
French, influenced the subsequent relationship between Cambodia and its neighbors, including 
Vietnam. 
Cambodia was part of French Indochina, which included both Laos and Vietnam. The 
movement for Cambodian independence was sparked by the brief moment of freedom at the end 
                                                 
39 See, for example, the work of the Transcultural Psychosocial Organization of Cambodia, 
http://www.tpocambodia.org/. 
40 See Part V, infra. 
41 See DAVID CHANDLER, Seeing Red: Perceptions of Cambodian History in Democratic Kampuchea, in FACING 
THE CAMBODIAN PAST 233, 249 (1996) (“DK spokesmen frequently claimed that the revolution, by liberating 
ordinary people, enabled them at last to write their own history. Up to the colonial era, Cambodian history had been 
written by foreigners and by the wrong Cambodians. . . . pure Cambodian history was impossible to compose until 
the emergence of the CPK.”). 
42 See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 179–183 (1983). But see DAVID CHANDLER, The Tragedy of 
Cambodian History Revisited, in FACING THE CAMBODIAN PAST, supra note 41, at 310, 316 (“Over the next century 
or so French savants deciphered over a thousand Cambodian inscriptions, dated a similar number of ruins, and 
established the chronology of Cambodian history. At the same time, they felt obliged to tell the Khmer about their 
present-day helplessness and their long-term ‘decline,’ noting en passant that without the French the country would 
have disappeared. I have argued that giving Cambodian intellectuals (and semi-intellectuals, like Sihanouk, Lon Nol, 
and Pol Pot) a grandiose, unusable past produced among them a folie de grandeur.”). 13 
 
of World War II before the return of the French; David Chandler notes the rise in Cambodian 
membership in the Vietnamese-dominated Indo-China Communist Party in the late ’40s.
43 The 
reliance of the Cambodian independence movement on support from both Thailand, and, 
increasingly, Vietnam, is somewhat ironic in light of the influence that those two countries have 
had over developments in Cambodia during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
44 However, 
for those Cambodians who challenged French rule, an alliance with the Vietnamese 
independence movement was necessary, even if independence risked being brought within the 
orbit of its larger neighbor.
45 
This aspect of the history, while somewhat removed from the events of the 1970s, has a 
direct connection: the Communist Party of Kampuchea under Pol Pot defined itself in opposition 
to the general Indochinese communist party; battles over defining the anniversary of the 
founding of the party became a measure of loyalty, reading contributions to the struggle that 
occurred before the split out of the history of the CPK.
46 The government of the Vietnam-backed 
People’s Republic of Kampuchea, the successor state to Democratic Kampuchea, reset the origin 
of the party to the earlier date.
47 One possible reading of the conflict between the Khmer Rouge 
and the Cambodian government post-’79 is as an internecine battle between factions of the 
Party.
48 Even today, the Vietnamese occupation is a sore spot for many Cambodians, and it is 
                                                 
43 See DAVID CHANDLER, The Kingdom of Kampuchea, March – October 1945, in FACING THE CAMBODIAN PAST, 
supra note 41, at 165, 187. 
44 Chandler notes that one of the major reasons for Cambodia’s problems is its relationship to Thailand and Vietnam: 
culturally closer to the Theravada Buddhist culture of Thailand, but with stronger commercial relations to Vietnam. 
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impossible to fully separate the current regime’s history with Vietnam from the content of the 
trials.
49 The question of continuity or rupture remains both live and material. 
The Vietnamese quickly sought to explain the history of the 1970s as a way of addressing 
the appalling conditions in Cambodia and securing their own legitimacy. A mere day after taking 
Phnom Penh, the government of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea created the People’s 
Revolutionary Tribunal to try Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in absentia.
50 The judgments were a 
foregone conclusion, but they did assemble important evidence and identify witnesses who 
continue to testify in the current trials.
51 The judgment required placing all blame on the “Pol 
Pot-Ieng Sary clique” rather than looking deeply across Cambodian society.
52 
The Vietnamese also established the museum at Tuol Sleng, the site of the infamous S-21 
prison, where Khmer Rouge cadres suspected of being enemies had been sent.
53 Mai Lam, a 
Vietnamese colonel who had organized the Museum of American War Crimes in Ho Chi Minh 
City, was fluent in Khmer, and had legal training, designed the museum, as well as the memorial 
stupa at Choeung Ek, S-21’s killing field.
54 Mai Lam drew upon the models of memorializing 
Auschwitz, despite the important differences between the concentration camps in which the 
Nazis imprisoned and executed Jews, and the prison where the Khmer Rouge sent its internal 
                                                 
49 The complexity of celebrating the “Victory over Genocide” holiday, which necessarily involves the Vietnamese 
occupation, was mentioned by Robert Finch, legal adviser at the Cambodian Center for Human Rights. Robert Finch, 
interview with author, Jan. 9, 2013, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 
50 Decree Law No. 1: Establishment of People’s Revolutionary Tribunal, Jan. 8, 1979, available at 
http://law.scu.edu/site/beth-van-schaack/File/Decree_Law_No._1.pdf. 
51 See, e.g., Denise Affonço’s testimony, Transcript of Case 002 Trial Day 139, Dec. 12, 2012. 
52 See Howard J. De Nike, Reflections of a Legal Anthropologist on the Trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, in GENOCIDE 
IN CAMBODIA 19, 24 (Howard J. De Nike, John Quigley, and Kenneth J. Robinson, eds., 2000) (“[T]he prosecution 
takes on added symbolic weight in the effort of the new government’s leadership, some of whom were themselves 
former Khmer Rouge members, to separate the emergent, ‘authentically Khmer,’ People’s Republic of Kampuchea 
from the prior regime. It is renegade Pol Pot and Ieng Sary who have bartered Cambodian patrimony for Maoist 
cultural revolution.”). 
53 See DAVID CHANDLER, VOICES FROM S-21: TERROR AND HISTORY IN POL POT’S SECRET PRISON 5 (1999). 
54 See id. at 4–8. 15 
 
enemies.
55 It is important to note that while the Vietnamese were quite interested in shaping the 
history of Democratic Kampuchea in order both to legitimate their own involvement and to 
understand how this revolution differed so strikingly from their own, there are no indications that 
this involved actively distorting the record. Nevertheless, the role of the Vietnamese (as 
interested parties with a complex relationship with Cambodia) in defining the history of DK has 
been raised by the defense as being potentially relevant.
56 
Throughout this period, participants in civil society and in academia have been involved 
in documenting and analyzing the events of Democratic Kampuchea. This work has involved 
recording the statements of refugees and of interviewing victims, perpetrators, and bystanders 
alike. It has also involved collecting primary documents and the writing historical accounts that 
begin to make sense of the events.
57 
The individuals engaged in documentation have had a variety of motivations for their 
work, arising out of both the Cold War context of Communist movements in Southeast Asia and 
the global human rights context that grew to prominence in the 1970s.
58 Individuals had their 
own idiosyncratic reasons for interest in Cambodia, as well as the more systemic/structural 
reasons. Within the small circle of Cambodia specialists, the domains of the personal and the 
professional are never entirely distinct. 
                                                 
55 See id. at 7–9. 
56 See Part IV, infra. 
57 For the importance of refugee interviews as a source of knowledge about the regime, see generally DAVID 
CHANDLER, Transformation in Cambodia, in FACING THE CAMBODIAN PAST, supra note 41, at 207. See also BEN 
KIERNAN, Reports from the Thai-Cambodian Border, 1979, in GENOCIDE AND RESISTANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 285. 
58 Consider David Chandler’s reflection on his 1977 essay, “Transformation in Cambodia,” which he now views as 
“a naïve, unduly optimistic assessment of the Cambodian revolution” that “reflects views that were widely held in 
‘anti-anti-Communist’ academic circles in the backwash of the Vietnam War.” DAVID CHANDLER, FACING THE 
CAMBODIAN PAST, supra note 41, at 205. See also Ben Kiernan’s reassessment in 1979: “Support for the Pol Pot 
regime may or may not be deemed logical from deductive argument concerning its ‘struggle for independence.’ But 
what might give such argument credibility, a detailed convincing analysis showing the regime’s internal policy to 
have served the interests of the Kampuchean workers and peasants, is still lacking. And having talked at length with 
workers and peasants who lived in many provinces of Kampuchea under Pol Pot through 1977–1978, I am certain it 
will never be produced.” BEN KIERNAN, Grappling with Genocide, 1978–1979, in GENOCIDE AND RESISTANCE IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 57, at 203, 210-211. 16 
 
Eventually, by the 1990s, the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam) had 
become established as the center for scholarly work and archival collections relating to the 
period of Democratic Kampuchea. In the decades before prosecution became possible, the people 
at DC-Cam worked to understand the events of ’75–’79, with the understanding that criminal 
cases could someday be brought.
59 But, given the uncertainty of trials ever occurring, the work of 
the Center had to fulfill more immediate goals. Inevitably, it was subject to the same political 
debates (domestic and international) that plagued Cambodia. 
Ben Kiernan, who founded the Cambodian Genocide Program at Yale University, and 
was closely tied to DC-Cam, documents the challenges to the operations of these two institutions. 
One such challenger, Stephen J. Morris of the Wall Street Journal, had supported the Khmer 
Rouge (which he described as “anti-Communist”) during the period of their opposition to the 
Vietnam-led PRK.
60 Morris’s accusations that the CGP was a hotbed of Marxism foundered in 
the press, but were continued in the Senate by Bob Dole, Trent Lott, and Jesse Helms.
61 The 
resulting alignments took on a curious character: the Cold War alliance of the Khmer Rouge with 
China and the United States against the Vietnam-USSR-PRK “often brought together 
conservative anti-communists and Maoist radicals. . . . Priorities for members of this coalition 
usually included disguising their own past support for the Khmer Rouge, burying the history of 
the Vietnam War, and yet refighting it by both covering for the Khmer Rouge and fanning the 
flames of the MIA issue.”
62 The ECCC has stepped into this treacherous and deeply politicized 
engagement with the past. One hope of its creators is that its legal formality can create some 
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breathing room within this toxic brew. But it may be naïve to believe that it can emerge from this 
without being sullied. 
B.  The Permanence of War 
The civil war, which continued into the ’90s, was a continuation of conflict that had 
persisted throughout the Cold War. When the North Vietnamese used eastern Cambodia (the 
parts of the country that were under partial control by the Khmer Rouge) as a refuge, the United 
States initiated a bombing campaign; after King Sihanouk was overthrown, the United States 
threw its support behind the corrupt and ineffective Lon Nol regime.
63 Cambodia’s domestic 
politics was subject to the complex geopolitical maneuverings of the United States, China, and 
the U.S.S.R. 
By the mid-1970s there was a full-fledged civil war between the Lon Nol regime in 
Phnom Penh, supported by the United States, and the Khmer Rouge in the countryside. The Lon 
Nol government was hardly a model regime, often incompetent or worse.
64 The bombing of the 
countryside continued in order to influence the direction of the civil war, even as conditions in 
the capital deteriorated in the ensuing refugee crisis.
65 The importance of the civil war in shaping 
the Khmer Rouge approach to armed conflict and to the residents of Phnom Penh is yet another 
contested issue in understanding the role of history. 
In 1979 the Vietnamese government overthrew the Khmer Rouge, replacing the 
government with one led by Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge leader from the East Zone 
who had fled to Vietnam during the purge of that region.
66 The Vietnamese rule was complicated 
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for Cambodians, who were happy that the rule of the Khmer Rouge was over, but resented the 
occupation and influence of the Vietnamese.
67 The Vietnamese sought to legitimate their 
intervention in Cambodia by pointing to the crimes of the Khmer Rouge — while ignoring the 
Khmer Rouge backgrounds of PRK leaders, such as Heng Samrin, or getting mired in the 
problem of addressing low-level participation in the revolution and the crimes committed by 
ordinary Cambodians. 
Following a period in which Cambodia was under the United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Hun Sen has remained firmly in power. During his rule, the 
remnants of the Khmer Rouge have put down their weapons, due in part to an amnesty that he 
offered them.
68 The delicacy of the situation prevented Hun Sen from pushing too hard on the 
Khmer Rouge, but eventually he agreed to the creation of a hybrid tribunal to try crimes from 
Democratic Kampuchea. 
The treatment of the Democratic Kampuchea era remains a touchstone for legitimacy in 
Cambodia, and the memory of this period continues to be hotly contested.
69 The PRK, seeking to 
establish their own legitimacy, created institutions for preserving the memory of the horrors of 
Democratic Kampuchea, and placing blame on the “Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique,” while also 
instituting holidays commemorating the “Day of Hatred” and the “Victory over Genocide 
Day.”
70 Despite the horror of Democratic Kampuchea, the fact of Vietnamese support for the 
CPP has created space for alternative, revisionist narratives: a 1994 radio broadcast by the 
Khmer Rouge declared that the skeletons at Tuol Sleng “are purely and simply part of the 
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psychological war waged by Vietnam in its aggression against Cambodia . . . part of a 
psychological propaganda campaign to legalize their aggression against and occupation of 
Cambodia.”
71 The elements of the Cambodian past, while not directly part of the current Khmer 
Rouge trials, nevertheless continue to shape events. Disputes over the specific crimes of 
Democratic Kampuchea are interpreted through the tumult of the past half century. Concepts 
such as responsibility and necessity derive their meaning from this background. And even if the 
ECCC only began investigating these matters in the 21
st century, other actors have been involved 
in shaping this background over the years. 
The negotiations between the United Nations and the governments of the United States 
and Cambodia occurred in this context. The history of American involvement in Cambodia 
influenced its determination to push for the tribunal, and the bargaining position of the parties 
was directly shaped by the contingent history of the civil war and of Hun Sen’s consolidation of 
power. Creating an international court offered the possibility of addressing this messy history 
through the formality of legal process, as distinguished from the bloody fighting that had raged 
for the past half-century. 
III.  The Internal Context: Divergent Approaches to Narrow Temporal Jurisdiction 
The court faces another set of challenges within the space of the courtroom. Some 
difficulties arise from its narrow jurisdiction and the endless battles to define the scope of events 
at issue. Other difficulties arise from the persistent threat of political interference, magnified by 
the court’s hybrid structure. For the court to maintain the requisite adherence to legal norms, it 
must resolve these internal challenges in accordance with standard fair trial principles. The 
challenge of internal validity must be solved within the space that has been addressed by most 
legal scholarship concerning the ECCC. This section will therefore be brief. 
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  The court exists as a space for law within a highly charged domain of social meaning and 
political contestation. While the requirement of legal process necessitates imposing narrow 
constraints on the scope of the court’s activities, the court also cannot make those boundaries too 
rigid and impermeable; it is inevitably drawn into these larger questions.
72 
There are two divergent approaches to addressing the scope of the court’s jurisdiction. 
The Nuon Chea team has suggested that many issues that are considered external to the case 
should be brought within it — and that the failure to so enlarge the trial undermines it. The Ieng 
Sary team, by contrast, has tried to draw out the complexity of particular issues deemed within 
the purview of the court, in order to drive them out. Because this approach deals more with the 
evidence that is introduced into the court, it is addressed in the next section.
73 This section 
instead focuses on the framing issues raised by the Nuon Chea defense. 
  While the trial chamber tacitly acknowledges the contextual elements, this does not 
translate into an explicit willingness to consider the effects of the context on the internal 
operations of the court in all matters. The Nuon Chea team has been particularly engaged in 
raising the issues of context in interesting ways. Their approach essentially boils down to an 
attempt to bring in the broader context of American bombing and the Vietnamese occupation — 
issues that the Trial Chamber repeatedly deems to be outside the jurisdiction of the court and 
therefore inadmissible.
74 However, the argument of the Nuon Chea team is not only that these 
seemingly external events are necessary to understand the events on trial; it is that these events 
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color the interpretation of the facts and are always already present inside the courtroom.
75 
Bringing them into the courtroom would enable them to be tested and examined rather than 
haunting the proceedings without being fully acknowledged.
76 
  The strategy of the Nuon Chea team raises the question of who gets to define the interior 
space of the courtroom. By repeatedly challenging the limitations imposed by the trial chamber, 
the defense team earned a sanction; but the extent of the disputes between the team and the 
judges was used to suggest judicial impropriety and bias.
77 
  The trial chamber’s decisions about what to let into the courtroom define the grounds of 
legal argument. While the trial chamber has been willing to address the context of the ’75–’79 
period (by allowing some discussions of the baseline situation in the early ’70s and the creation 
of the CPK), it has been unwilling to address the issue of historical narrative: how the events of 
the DK period have been refracted through the subsequent history of Cambodia. 
The refusal to consider these elements weakens the roots that bind the court to the soil of 
Cambodian society. For even if the court takes a naïve view of how narrative operates, outside 
analysts of the court’s role in Cambodia (including historians and social theorists) may not be so 
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quick to reject this fundamental aspect of the court’s situation. The refusal to be reflexive in a 
complex legal context simply undermines the notion of legitimacy.
78 
Of course, the maintenance of the interior space of the law serves some essential 
functions. One of the major challenges of the court is to protect the integrity of the legal 
proceedings against a background of political interference. Consider the Nuon Chea team’s 
argument that Hun Sen’s public statements calling their client a murderer violated his fair trial 
rights.
79 The Trial Chamber declined to take action against Hun Sen, a decision later affirmed by 
the Supreme Court Chamber (SCC).
80 The SCC argued that there was no legal basis for taking 
action, and that the proper remedy was to reaffirm that public statements would have no bearing 
on the judgment. The effect of these decisions was to heighten the court’s commitment to 
exclude potentially dangerous external statements. It is possible that the reaction against the 
expansion of historical context is a reflection of these concerns about interference.
81 
However, the court is weakened by its simplistic treatment of history and by its refusal to 
engage with the factors that mark its unique context. The façade that this is an ordinary court, in 
which the internal legal mechanisms can be treated with minimal reference to the external 
concerns about truth, justice, and Cambodian society, undermines its objectivity. The situation 
calls for a frank acknowledgement of the context, of what makes these chambers “extraordinary.” 
It is no concession to relativism to locate this court as a particular implementation of some 
mechanism of justice with universal aspiration. The court already operates to construct and 
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defend a boundary between the internal space of law and the external demands of a complex 
society; it must be analyzed from within that understanding. The particularities of the historical 
situation can only serve as a means to discredit the court if they go unacknowledged and are 
swept under the carpet. Acknowledging that the operations of a court in Cambodia must 
necessarily deviate from the ideal (unattainable even in the most sophisticated legal systems) 
allows us to analyze its form of justice, free from preconceptions. 
IV.  Bringing the Outside In: The Role of Historical Evidence and Expert Historians 
If we wish to understand the court’s operations in terms of demarcating the boundary 
between internal conceptions of legality and external conceptions of justice, we must examine 
the bi-directional traffic across the boundary. The court adjusts the boundary to bring in 
historical expertise and contextual evidence that does not strictly fall within its jurisdiction, and 
the larger society draws lessons regarding the process of reconciliation from the decisions of the 
court. The boundary only comes into focus through the continual contestation of the parties and 
through the larger efforts to articulate what the court is doing; the boundary has no form 
independent of the actual experience of the court. Formally, the court’s jurisdiction marks out 
where the boundary is — the court only can deal with crimes from 1975–1979, and only has 
jurisdiction over the senior leaders and those most responsible.
82 These terms are contested, 
however, and history plays an important role in defining them. But the use of history raises 
questions about the nature of the court’s evidence. 
A.  DC-Cam: Accountability and the Archive 
A unique feature of the ECCC is that much of the documentary evidence comes from a 
single institution, the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam). Its role has therefore been 
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subject to examination by the court. This relates primarily to the immediate questions of the 
chain-of-custody and authentication of documents, but also the extent to which the processes of 
writing the history of Democratic Kampuchea, preserving the memory of the crimes committed 
within it, and beginning to think through the question of accountability have been examined over 
several decades by independent actors. DC-Cam’s director, Youk Chhang, explained how it grew 
out of earlier efforts by lawyers and historians, supported by groups such as the National 
Endowment for Democracy.
83 
He described three objectives for DC-Cam: studying history to promote national 
reconciliation (including the creation of “an independent court to ascertain the truth of what 
happened in the past.”); teaching the history of Democratic Kampuchea to schoolchildren and the 
public; and creating a research center for the future study of Cambodia.
84 If, today, the ECCC 
represents the focal point of legal efforts to address the crimes of Democratic Kampuchea, DC-
Cam remains the focal point for scholarly attention on the topic. The ECCC and DC-Cam 
function as two clusters of activity, their work closely related but always necessarily remaining 
distinct. 
DC-Cam was created in the context of Cambodia’s inability to prosecute the crimes of 
Democratic Kampuchea. Chhang recounted an exchange with an Australian prosecutor about 
how to bring accountability for the crimes of the DK era, in which he was told to “wait until the 
Court is actually established.” He described his response: “How can we wait anymore? Because 
we have been waiting for many years already.”
85 Chhang and others who wanted justice and 
accountability could not wait for the creation of a court if they wanted to move forward. The 
delay in creating a court meant that other vehicles for determining truth and accountability had to 
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be used instead; the subsequent creation of the court occurred within a legal space that had 
become accustomed to its absence, but that nevertheless had always been directed toward the 
possibility of its creation. DC-Cam occupied a very particular role in Cambodian civil society: 
not part of the judicial system, but existing in its shadow. 
In pursuing these alternative measures, Chhang considered the possibility of advocating 
for a Truth Commission, but ultimately he did not believe that this was an appropriate fit with 
Cambodian culture and norms of justice.
86 Instead, DC-Cam’s work focused on a series of 
interviews with people throughout Cambodian society: encouraging them to tell their stories 
without any formal legal consequences. These constitute some of the richest sources of oral 
history from this period, and make an interesting counterpoint to the interviews conducted by the 
ECCC’s Office of Co-Investigating Judges.
87 
Given the motivations for the creation of DC-Cam, its neutrality has been challenged by 
some of the defense teams. But there are complications: raising the issue of the organization’s 
mission risks opening up discussions about its broader goals. When Pich Ang, for the civil 
parties, asked about the mission of DC-Cam, Ieng Sary’s international counsel, Michael 
Karnavas, objected: “He’s here to give evidence as to how the documents are collected, stored, 
categorized, and used. That’s the whole purpose, not for civil parties to give a venue to the 
director to talk about reconciliation, all these grand issues and aspirations that we all agree are 
noble.”
88 Lead international lawyer for the civil parties, Elisabeth Simonneau-Fort, then asked 
directly whether the broader mission affected the reliability of DC-Cam’s archival practices: 
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“you’re engaged in the struggle against impunity, crimes against humanity, and crimes of 
genocide. . . . would this commitments [sic] force you to make any breaches in the ethical 
manner in which you carry out your work?”
89 Chhang denied this possibility. 
DC-Cam’s important role in building the factual record for the tribunal had to be read 
against the similar role played by judicial investigators. As Chhang explained, “No laws stipulate 
that the word ‘investigate’ is only for the Court. I can be seen as I was investigating [sic], but it 
may not mean in a legal sense.”
90 Judge Lavergne distinguished between “the research that is 
conducted by DC-Cam” that is “of great interest for historical — for academic reasons” from 
“the documents that are part and parcel of these judicial proceedings.”
91 The problem, as Khieu 
Samphan’s international counsel, Arthur Vercken, noted, was that “we have an organization . . . 
that carries out its own and proper activities,” but, according to the defense, “the Prosecution has 
taken for granted the value of those documents, integrated them directly into the case file . . . 
This is exactly why the two issues [academic and judicial] that you have just raised are 
intrinsically related.”
92 This defense team disputed the notion that the quality of the documents 
could be divorced from the context in which they were collected. This has further salience given 
the myriad problems identified with the interviews of the Office of Co-Investigating Judges.
93 
The questioning also turned on the meaning of the word “evidence” — whether the 
process of collecting documentary information about the Khmer Rouge constituted an effort to 
collect legal evidence. As with the word “investigation,” Chhang stated that he was not using the 
word in any technical, legal sense: “I’m saying here that law does not monopolize the word — 
the use of the word ‘evidence.’ For me, coming from a social science background, we use this 
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word for the purpose of our research because we want to know what happened in the history.”
94 
This exchange highlights the tension in understanding the role of DC-Cam and the historians 
affiliated with it: they constructed their histories of the period for purposes that were distinct 
from (if related to) the legal machinery of the court. The investigative process should have 
created a record in which all procedural safeguards were met, but there are questions as to 
whether this actually occurred. As Lavergne’s question suggested, in ordinary legal practice, 
questions about an organization’s overall goals may be secondary, and distinguishable, from the 
question of document authenticity. But, given its politicization and unique historical context, this 
is not an ordinary legal setting, and the origin of documents cannot be so easily divorced from 
the overall mission of the archive. 
As noted above, the failure to establish a court sooner meant that DC-Cam had no real 
alternative but to construct a record independently, and its archive has been a crucial source of 
documentation for the entire Democratic Kampuchea period. However, DC-Cam’s projects were 
not legal investigations and were not conducted according to that standard. While the formal 
investigation through the Office of Co-Investigative Judges (OCIJ) was designed to create a 
record in accordance with legal principles, a major point of concern for the defense has been the 
relationships among the various stages in this process. To the extent that either the Prosecution or 
the investigating judges have been influenced by the pre-existing framework of accountability 
for the crimes of Democratic Kampuchea, how are we to understand this organization’s role?
95 
The Nuon Chea defense team elaborated on this by asking about the “invisible archive” 
— the documents that have not been collected and that have therefore been omitted from the 
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record. Said Jasper Pauw, “We cannot limit ourselves to just discussing the documents that have 
been found and that have been transferred; we need to also discuss what documents have not 
been looked for, have not been collected or, possibly, have not been transferred.”
96 Pauw raised 
the question of whether the interest in preparing files for future prosecutions undermined the 
neutrality of the process through which documents were collected.
97 The implication of this line 
of questioning was that the actions of DC-Cam during the years before the trial may have 
influenced the contents of this repository. 
The prosecution objected to this line of questioning, arguing that these contextual matters 
were irrelevant to the issues of document authentication.
98 But while the suggestion that the 
archival record was actively shaped to lead to certain legal results has no evidentiary support, the 
more abstract question retains its force: that the formal investigation was built upon a pre-
existing foundation of documents and historical arguments that was not, itself, subject to judicial 
supervision. The question of how to define this starting point may be relevant without presuming 
any bad faith on the part of any actors inside or outside of the court. 
The Nuon Chea defense brought up an email from historian Steve Heder on this issue, 
stating “I believe it was wrong for DC-Cam to have become involved in attempting to define and 
prejudice the scope of potential prosecutions . . . it appears to tie DC-Cam to a politically-driven 
agenda that directs and limits the search.”
99 In response, Judge Cartwright noted that the Trial 
Chamber “fully understands” the reasons for asking about this issue, but ruled the questioning 
out of bounds.
100 The judges seem to recognize the defense’s point that the role of DC-Cam in 
the process of creating the primary evidentiary record is a legitimate concern, even as it denied 
                                                 
96 Chhang testimony, Transcript of Trial Day 26, at p. 67, ll. 18–22. 
97 See Chhang testimony, Transcript of Trial Day 26, at p. 76. 
98 See Chhang testimony, Transcript of Trial Day 26, at p. 105 
99 Chhang testimony, Transcript of Trial Day 26, p. 107, ll. 11–14, 19–22. 
100 Chhang testimony, Transcript of Trial Day 26, p. 111, ll. 23–24. 29 
 
that this was the proper place for those questions. I suggest that this is best understood in terms 
of the internal/external boundary: DC-Cam’s role from a purely internal perspective is as a link 
in the chain of custody of the documents, and it is examined on those terms. The question of how 
the organization’s mission may have indirectly influenced the contents is ruled out. This makes 
sense, given that the defense has been unable to offer any specific evidence on this point; the 
influence of the Vietnamese occupation and private opinions about this or that defendant are 
presumptively without effect.
101  
But this also misses something: DC-Cam is not only a link in the chain of custody; it has 
served as the focal point for non-judicial investigations into Democratic Kampuchea. It is, in a 
sense, the negative image of the court.
102 And while the issue of document authentication is 
important, the influence of DC-Cam extends beyond its role as a custodian of records to its role 
as the leading civil society institution engaged in the process of writing the history of the period. 
Questions about culling the record or prejudicing document collection are both speculative and 
beside the point; the issue of the degree to which individuals affiliated with DC-Cam acted in a 
legal sense concerns the extent to which the court can be seen to exist as a fully independent 
institution. As Heder recognized, given the political stakes of the prosecutions, the construction 
of the legal case had to be sharply distinguished from non-judicial analyses. This is somewhat 
ironic, given that Heder had previously written a book entitled “Seven Candidates for 
Prosecution,” which had been published by DC-Cam.
103 That is, the value of the court is to 
create the breathing room that comes from moving the trial from the realm of combative politics 
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(which, in Cambodia, can involve rockets and grenades) to that of the ritualized combat of 
judicial process. Precisely because the cases could never be insulated from the larger concerns of 
Cambodian society, the boundary between historical investigation and legal investigation had to 
be maintained as sharply as possible. Precisely because the question of DC-Cam’s role remains 
so foundational, such questions could never be posed within the courtroom. 
B.  The Atrocity Experts: Historians as Expert Witnesses 
When historian David Chandler testified in Case 002, his testimony largely concerned the 
issue of how the policies that were described in documents from Democratic Kampuchea 
translated into actual practices.
104 However, it was clear throughout the questioning that some of 
the approaches taken by Chandler in the course of his research fit uncomfortably within the 
evidentiary framework of the court. He described his research agenda as being “as open and fair 
to the evidence as I could be and . . . to consult as many kinds of evidence as I could to widen my 
understanding and to clarify facts.”
105 A few challenges were raised, particularly concerning the 
distance between evidentiary norms in history writing and in a criminal trial. Karnavas 
repeatedly challenged Chandler on the sources of his assertions, flagging several instances in 
which Chandler made an assumption about the state of mind of Pol Pot.
106 As Chandler noted, he 
was faced with instances in which there simply was no documentary source on point, but the 
obligation to write a narrative and to make sense of the past involved taking leaps that were not 
strictly compelled by the evidence. However, in the space of criminal prosecution, the evidence 
must be addressed to issues that can be proven, and to ensuring that these elements correspond to 
the elements of the charged crime. Understanding, in the broader sense, is unnecessary and may 
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even be counterproductive.
107 Thus, while the insistence of the defense counsel on footnotes and 
citations was clearly frustrating, and appeared irrelevant to the substance of Chandler’s 
testimony,
108 these issues went to the difference between the historian’s task of explaining and 
understanding the past (with the possibility that his or her explanations will later be shown to be 
wrong) and the prosecution’s burden of building an air-tight case in which every element of the 
crime is proven.
109 
Chandler’s testimony revealed the process of how an academic historian began 
explaining the events of Democratic Kampuchea. He started his investigations with a series of 
refugee interviews, attempting to write a tentative explanation of events in Cambodia from these 
partial accounts.
110 He acknowledged the uncertainty of the conclusions and began posing 
hypotheses, collecting information, and proposing an agenda for future research. This is 
essentially an inversion of the legal process, in which arguments are directed toward a particular 
conclusion, following the culmination of a thorough investigation.
111 At times it was suggested 
that his interviews and factual sources were directed to certain ends, a suggestion that he 
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disputed. Challenging the notion that historians had to be perfectly neutral observers to maintain 
objectivity, Chandler said “I’ve never found a person who had a neutral view of Democratic 
Kampuchea.”
112 
The scope of Chandler’s expertise was also contested: Karnavas challenged his 
competence to evaluate the legal documents of DK — though these documents can arguably be 
interpreted from a number of perspectives.
113 As an interpretation of the legal import of these 
documents, Karnavas’s point has some merit, but as an analysis that contextualizes these 
documents in terms of those produced by other Communist regimes, this kind of interpretive act 
remains more firmly located within the expertise of the historian.
114 
The question is how the perspective of the expert historian can best inform the work of 
the court without violating the specific practices that constrain criminal trials. While expert 
historians have the opportunity to contribute to the case by putting the specific facts in context — 
as Chandler did in his explanations of the origin and the functions of the CPK — there are 
limitations on how far this can go before it impermissibly opens up issues that are not properly 
within the scope of the case. But, to be relevant, the historian’s expertise either remains on the 
level of structure and context that sits in tension with the liberal emphasis on individual actions, 
or it relates to ultimate issues.
115 The evidentiary rules of international criminal tribunals tend to 
be more relaxed on expert testimony concerning ultimate issues, because the judgment is 
rendered by trained judges rather than juries.
116 But the tension remains.
117 
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We also see this tension in the disputes about the degree of confidence Chandler could 
have in his opinions; Karnavas asked whether Chandler’s qualifications in answering factual 
questions should be disqualifying, suggesting that they indicated a lack of knowledge — or at 
least, a lack of the kind of certainty that is necessary for evidence in a criminal trial.
118 Chandler 
responded that these kinds of inferences were necessary: “if anyone in this room knows for sure 
what happened . . . in S-21, as those decisions were being made — I don’t think they exist. . . . 
I’m not going to say ‘this absolutely happened’; I wasn’t there. I used documents to make — to 
conclude from the documents what I thought — that’s all I can do, is think — happened.”
119 
One of the more interesting exchanges involved the question of how the history of the 
years between the fall of Democratic Kampuchea and the present has affected the historical 
understandings of the Khmer Rouge. The defense suggested that during this occupation, the 
Vietnamese may have established the dominant narrative that places all blame for the crimes of 
DK on the Case 002 defendants — the “Pol Pot/Ieng Sary clique.”
120 Chandler responded that 
the shortcomings of this standard narrative about the Khmer Rouge can be overcome through 
serious historical scholarship and through the legal determination of criminal responsibility.
121 
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The benefit from putting some space between a trial for administrative massacre and the events 
in question is that “information comes available that was not available before,” and reasoned 
analysis can “look[] out for easy exits, like the Pol Pot/Ieng Sary genocidal clique, or exits that 
suggest that the top officials knew nothing about this so therefore they shouldn’t be here.”
122 
But the Nuon Chea team’s rejoinder (for which no specific evidence was provided) was 
that the documents available at the trial may have been manipulated by the Vietnamese.
123 The 
Nuon Chea defense argued, as a more general matter, that the temporal limits of the case ought 
not to rule out discussion of events post-’79 that had a bearing on the evidence of the ’75–’79 
period.
124 As Pauw put it later, “the facts that we are talking about . . . can be influenced by later 
historical conventions and understandings. . . . I’m trying to link together the history of the CPP, 
the history of certain persons in the CPP to explain what now their attitude towards the trial 
might be.”
125 
We can see the defense taking two approaches to the introduction of history. Karnavas 
used the requirement of detailed citation to undermine the basis of Chandler’s expertise. 
Wherever Chandler could not point to a primary source, his scholarly historical method was 
undermined. This may have reflected the scholarly appraisal of the team’s historian-consultant, 
Michael Vickery, whose opinion of Chandler’s work is that it may be eloquent and theoretically 
sophisticated, but not as grounded as it should be.
126 On the other hand, Pauw tried to reframe the 
history of the 1970s, bringing in additional context to make the trial also about American 
involvement in Southeast Asia and about the Vietnamese role in Cambodia after 1979. The 
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prosecution, meanwhile, was content to use historical evidence as a shortcut to documentary 
evidence and witnesses.
127 For them, the framing issue was resolved by the indictment and the 
temporal jurisdiction of the court, and the basis of historical expertise was used more informally 
as a means to get to primary sources. Expert interpretation helped as a way of bringing the 
threads together. 
V.  Bringing the Inside Out: The Court’s Role in Shaping Cambodian Society 
We must also consider how the boundary appears from the outside, from the perspective 
of civil society groups and individuals who are not primarily concerned with the court’s 
operations. This requires explaining how the work of the court addresses the larger challenges of 
both writing Cambodian history and moving Cambodian society forward through a full 
recognition of (and reconciliation with) the past. As David Lorey and William Beezley observe, 
“At the very center of all of these issues of recovery, reconciliation, and looking forward is 
history — here in particular, the social processing of memories of genocide and collective 
violence.”
128 The NGOs operating in this space have different interests and pursue different 
projects, but DC-Cam operates as a focal point for the work that surrounds the court and its 
position in Cambodian society. This section considers how the operations of the court feed into 
larger discussions of Democratic Kampuchea’s place in modern Cambodian history. 
The role of the court for the larger projects of memory and reconciliation is contested. 
One important attitude envisions a narrow role for the court. This perspective reinforces the idea 
of separation — less to protect the mechanisms of legality from being tainted by political and 
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social factors
129 than to protect the resolution of broader issues from the creeping encroachment 
of the law.
130 Judith Shklar has described the ideological position of lawyers as being based in 
“legalism,” which she describes as “the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of 
rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules.”
131 
The position of legalism has several consequences, including an orientation that privileges 
specificity and individual treatment over generality — important precautions in the practice of 
law, but that leave it unable (and usually unwilling) to attempt to tackle larger social problems 
and to experiment in finding novel forms of explanation; legalism is fundamentally conservative 
in its ambitions.
132 If the court views itself as engaging in the writing of history or in the project 
of helping people recover from trauma, it is likely to do this project badly. 
An alternative view, perhaps more closely aligned with the world of international NGOs, 
is to erase this boundary in order to address Cambodia’s myriad problems.
133 The court cannot 
satisfy either side in this debate. It is probably doomed to be inadequate as a vehicle for engaging 
with history or reconciliation. At the same time, by having been invited into Cambodia by both 
the Cambodian government and the international community, the court is an intervention in 
Cambodian history and must be recognized as such; one does not invite a United Nations 
tribunal without expecting some shaping of Cambodian society
134 and influence in the 
subsequent writing of Cambodian history (in this sense, the court’s role in ascertaining the truth 
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stands as a curious counterpoint to its reluctance to acknowledge any potential influence in 
historical narrative from the Vietnamese occupation).
135 
Despite these shortcomings, the law has attempted to address these kinds of innately 
political mass atrocities. Mark Osiel captures the dilemma well: “On the one hand, we seek 
fidelity to a longstanding ideal of individual responsibility. Most of Western legality — 
including the features most normatively compelling about it — is so deeply committed to this 
ideal that its abandonment would surely set off wide shock waves. On the other hand, we 
recognize that modern mass atrocity displays peculiar features that are morally relevant to 
punishing its participants.”
136 He recognizes that an outside observer of these legal proceedings 
may well find these self-imposed limitations jarring, and that a more natural way of proceeding 
may be to look first to scholarship in history, psychology, sociology, economics, etc. to develop 
a theoretical basis for tackling administrative massacres, rather than to first turn to criminal law 
and mechanisms developed to deal with ordinary matters of domestic justice.
137 
As Osiel describes it, those who seek to uphold narrowly legalistic values “are likely to 
come off as plodding dullards, distracted by doctrinal trivia from the issues of truly ‘historic’ 
importance before them.”
138 But, ultimately, these sorts of considerations reflect the particular 
position of lawyers within a society. Lawyers bring the power of the state to bear on the process 
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of generating an official record of events, and this responsibility requires a more circumspect 
approach than the gravity of the situation might first suggest. 
The basic problem is that law is forced to maintain an ambiguous relationship with the 
larger issues that give meaning to its operations. Law must recognize and acknowledge the broad 
questions that are asked in any attempt to come to terms with atrocity, even if it cannot itself 
answer them. Indeed, courts may err by attempting to ask excessively broad questions. The 
courtroom is simply not a good site for deep discussions of history, or rituals of social 
reconciliation, even if it has a role to play in each of those projects. As analysts, including 
perhaps most famously Hannah Arendt, have observed, the narrow questions that are addressed 
in the courtroom have the virtue of clarity, finality, and an emphasis on individual responsibility 
— all of which allow it to reach judgments regarding issues that may be too broad for anything 
resembling final resolution. 
Trials allow for the possibility of getting beyond the unspeakable by virtue of their 
concreteness. But this is also the cause of their weakness: resolving narrow issues without a 
corresponding awareness of larger concerns can lead the court to misunderstand its position in 
the world — achieving the form of justice without the substance. As Arendt observed of the 
Auschwitz trials, “the court . . . tried hard to exclude all political issues — ‘Political guilt, moral 
and ethical guilt, were not the subject of its concern’ — and to conduct the truly extraordinary 
proceedings as ‘an ordinary criminal trial, regardless of its background.’ But the political 
background of both past and present . . . made itself felt factually and juridically in every single 
session.”
139 
The influence of the larger background issues similarly pervades this court, despite the 
best efforts of the parties to carefully cabin them. The interest in the DK period among those who 
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work in civil society generally takes one of three forms: focus on documentation and 
understanding of this historical period; focus on trauma and directly assisting the Cambodian 
people in healing through empowering them to speak; and focus on the court as a vehicle for the 
promotion of justice human rights more generally within contemporary Cambodia.
140 In other 
words, the contemporary interest in the trial focuses on truth, healing, and accountability. Each 
of these can be seen in various aspects of the court structure and proceedings. 
A.  The Judgment as History and the Judgment of History 
Courts often struggle to accommodate the norms of historical scholarship, just as 
historians often struggle to fit their work into juridical forms, suggesting a basic mismatch 
between the goals of each project. Daniel Farber summarizes the problem as: “For the lawyer, 
the question is whether the litigation process can claim the goal of establishing truth. For the 
historian, the question is whether scholarship can be distinguished from advocacy, or objectivity 
from ideology.”
141 There are problems in bringing historical expertise within the rules of 
procedure and evidence, and then presuming that the findings of fact in a (historical) trial are the 
same kind of factual accounts that may be provided by historical scholarship. The task of 
understanding and explaining the past may simply be different than the task of coming to 
judgment about alleged crimes that occurred in the past; the function of historical analysis and 
judgment may be complementary but fundamentally different.
142 This is independent of the 
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additional problems that arise from a party-driven fact finding process: “As long as advocates 
exist, so will warped history.”
143 Reuel Schiller offers a good account of both the problems 
facing the historian testifying as an expert, and the challenge of lawyers in coming to terms with 
a scholarly project that questions naïve notions of objectivity without falling into “radical anti-
foundationalis[m].”
144 Schiller suggests that the real threat to establishing historical truths in the 
courtroom is less the academic commitment to multiple perspectives and skepticism than 
“falsehoods, myths, and ideologically-biased narratives masquerading as truths under the banner 
of objectivity.”
145  
The form of judicial fact-finding tends to quash the subtleties of historical analysis in the 
attempt to establish a robust, iron-clad narrative of the events within the limited scope of the 
indictment, fitting what Mark Osiel describes as the model of closure, based on Durkheim’s 
approach to solidarity as requiring social consensus: the uniformity of the narrative and judgment 
is what expresses social value.
146 At the opposite end of the spectrum, Osiel situates Lyotard and 
the view that dissensus is valuable in its own right for exploding the closed nature of 
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Durkheimian consensus.
147 The midpoint of the spectrum Osiel describes as the liberal position, 
in which competing narratives can coexist within an atmosphere of mutual respect and civility, 
as a way of creating solidarity through a shared commitment to a project of working through the 
process of judgment.
148 Pace Durkheim, we should focus on the constructive process of the trial, 
rather than the judgment. Osiel endorses a model of civil dissensus, in which the judgment opens 
questions rather than closing them.
149 Koskenniemi notes that there will always be competing 
narratives: “For any major event of international politics — and situations where the criminal 
responsibility of political leaders is involved are inevitably such — there are many truths and 
many stakeholders for them.”
150 Osiel notes the implication of the multiplicity of narratives 
within the courtroom: “These accounts search for authoritative recognition, and judgments likely 
will be viewed as endorsing one or another version of collective memory. . . . Better to face facts, 
to learn to live with the reality that such trials will necessarily be read for their ‘larger lessons,’ 
as monumental didactics.”
151 The court is already the setting for contests to control narrative. 
But Osiel wonders whether this is something that can actually occur within the 
performance of a trial: “Must prosecutorial decisions about the dramatic staging of a trial for 
administrative massacre be kept ‘backstage’ . . . never acknowledged in public, for fear of being 
charged with partisan ‘manipulation’ or with breaching the judicial ethic of impartiality?”
152 He 
concludes that the parties should recognize the thoroughgoing nature of narrative for criminal 
law, and that this need not result in any kind of radical anti-foundationalism. As attractive as this 
model is in terms of situating the judgment within larger issues of social meaning, it seems 
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difficult to square the goal of dissensus with the obligations of meeting a high burden of proof in 
a criminal trial. To the extent that findings of legal guilt require proof beyond reasonable doubt, 
the model of dissensus seems to require the acknowledgement of doubt, or at least of open-
endedness that sits uncomfortably with the principle of res judicata. 
Jose Alvarez offers a slightly different perspective, in which the parties to the trial accept 
the impossibility of reconciling judgment with good history, but in which the court’s 
presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the defendant. “We might opt for flawed 
historical accounts in the course of criminal judgments on the assumption that the process of 
civil dissensus will correct bad history but is incapable of truly rectifying a mistaken verdict 
against a defendant, at least from the perspective of an individual who unjustly serves prison 
time.”
153 Alvarez recognizes that the needs of liberal dissensus in the writing of history and the 
burden of proof required of criminal judgment are at odds. 
What of the products of judicial attempts to define history? Alvarez notes of the Tadić 
judgment, the first issued by the ICTY, “Tadić’s judges are demonstrably poor historians. It 
seems inconceivable that anyone, even those favorably disposed to the judges’ version of the 
facts, can read the judges’ historical account as a convincing or definitive history.”
154 Richard 
Ashby Wilson, however, has argued that atrocity trials can produce accurate and valuable 
histories.
155 It is difficult to reconcile these two positions, but this difference may follow from 
what the two critics want from their histories: Alvarez focuses on the impossibility of using court 
histories to achieve closure, while Wilson focuses on the possibility of achieving factual 
accuracy. But, as mentioned above, the function of history in these trials is only partly about 
being a source of accurate facts; the more important aspect of this history is about how the facts 
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are marshaled to define accountability.
156 On this reading, even if Wilson is correct that the 
Tadić court provided a better historical narrative than the nationalist myths circulating in the 
former Yugoslavia (not necessarily a high bar to meet), this still does not mean that it contributed 
to an accurate or useful historical framing of the conflict. 
The problem, which Wilson downplays, is of distinguishing history that is useful for 
historical ends from history that is useful for informing judicial ends. The issue is not the forum 
in which history is discussed — as though the courtroom would otherwise operate as a history-
free zone — but rather the ends to which the history is directed; courtrooms are simply 
inappropriate fora for wide-ranging historical inquiry. The courts’ engagement with history may 
be sufficient as a means of providing a factual foundation for judgment, while remaining 
unhelpful as a contribution to historical discourse.
157 History in the courtroom is in some sense 
fundamentally different from history in the seminar room.
158 
Consider Chandler’s testimony in case 001. Francois Roux, defense attorney for Duch 
(the head of S-21), asked Chandler whether he thought “this trial will be of service to history.”
159 
Chandler responded: “I think it’s important that all of these accused people face up to their 
responsibilities to the truth of what happened when they had positions of power, to question that 
evidence if it’s unreliable or false, and to allow the Cambodian people, at least some of them, to 
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have some awareness of what happened in a scale wider than their horrific stories anybody in 
this room can pick up from any Cambodian person over 40.”
160 
Picking up the question of the responsibilities of subordinates, Chandler’s testimony in 
Case 001 included an extended discussion of the Milgram Experiment
161 with the conclusion that 
“this gets very close to the culture . . . of Democratic Kampuchea where the people who gave the 
orders were accustomed to giving them; the people who received the orders were accustomed to 
obeying. There is no culture in Cambodia of questioning commands by someone who is an 
authority.”
162 When Roux proceeded to read out the final sentence of Chandler’s book on S-21 
(“In order to find the root of evil that was implemented every day at S-21, we should not look 
any further than ourselves”), Chandler noted that “it was not written in or for a judicial 
proceeding.”
163 He proceeded to explain that the point of this was to push back against the 
tendency to moralize, and instead to acknowledge the universal capacity to do evil — but that 
this recognition does not excuse or exculpate specific evil acts.
164 
Hannah Arendt explained the limitations of law in similar terms, contrasting the formality 
and specific limitations of the law with the larger issues at stake in the Eichmann trial: “there 
exists still one institution in society in which it is well-nigh impossible to evade issues of 
personal responsibility, where all justifications of a nonspecific, abstract nature . . . break down, 
where not systems or trends or original sin are judged, but men of flesh and blood like you and 
me.”
165 But the decision to try individuals in this way structures the how the problem is 
described. The legal focus on individual responsibility and individual acts means consigning 
                                                 
160 David Chandler, Transcript of Case 001 Trial Day 55, at p. 105, ll. 9–15. 
161 See Case 001 Trial Day 55, at pp. 116–118. 
162 Case 001 Trial Day 55, at p. 118, ll. 17–22. 
163 Case 001 Trial Day 55, at p. 120, ll. 4–8. 
164 Case 001 Trial Day 55, at pp. 120–121.  
165 HANNAH ARENDT, Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship, in RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDGMENT, supra note 
139, at 17, 21. 45 
 
structural explanations to the background; as Koskenniemi puts it, “individualization is not 
neutral in its effects.”
166 His position is that sometimes an individual focus is appropriate, while 
sometimes the contextual focus is appropriate; but that it is impossible to determine a priori that 
a criminal trial is the best option. The choice of the legal frame structures the possible solution 
space. 
There are numerous ironies in the historical accounts generated by the court through its 
pursuit of legal accountability. Consider the role of S-21, one of the major prisons of the regime. 
As mentioned above, the Vietnamese took a major interest in S-21, as part of their legitimation 
of the occupation of Cambodia. This included efforts to memorialize the prison as similar to 
Auschwitz. Yet the parallel is flawed: while the concentration camps were used to imprison Jews 
who had been targeted solely on account of race, S-21 held enemies of the regime who came 
from the ranks of Khmer Rouge cadres. The ECCC has similarly made S-21 central to the trials, 
due to the voluminous evidence from the prison and the gravity of the crimes that occurred 
there.
167 But it remains far from the experience of the millions of Cambodians who suffered in 
Democratic Kampuchea.
168 
Given the limitations that exist on the legal work of the court, no party can abandon its 
strategic goals in order to identify historical lessons.
169 The prosecutors have a case to prove, and 
direct their focus toward proving the elements of the charged crimes; the defense attorneys must 
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rebut this evidence and identify holes in the prosecution’s case. This cannot be totally divorced 
from the facts on the ground, but neither can the demands of writing nuanced history distract the 
parties from their tasks. 
B.  Collective Reparations and Genocide Education 
Victims play a vital role in the ECCC, reflecting the court’s orientation toward hearing a 
variety of voices speaking on the crimes of the past. Victim participation may serve a therapeutic 
function — this is a contested issue that is beyond the scope of this paper.
170 But it also serves as 
a mechanism for the telling of a particular kind of narrative about the events of Democratic 
Kampuchea: one that has less to do with the structure of command authority or about the 
resonances and dissonances among Chinese and Cambodian and Soviet and Western variants of 
Communism, but that has everything to do with getting at the particular experiences of 
individuals living in Cambodia. Victim testimony provides a necessary outlet for emotional 
evidence in proceedings that emphasize the formalities of legal reason.
171 But it also ties into the 
Durkheimian project of symbolism and communal affirmation critiqued by Osiel above.
172 
Martti Koskenniemi suggests that the truth-finding function of international criminal 
trials “has been thought necessary so as to enable the commencement of the healing process in 
the victim: only when the injustice to which a person has been subjected has been publicly 
recognized, the conditions for recovering from trauma are present and the dignity of the victim 
may be restored.” By contrast, when viewing trials as elements of a broader effort at achieving 
transitional justice, the function of judgment is as a symbolic affirmation of social norms and 
communal healing — for which “it is sufficient that a few well-published trials are held at which 
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the ‘truth’ of the past is demonstrated, the victims’ voices are heard and the moral principles of 
the (new) community are affirmed.”
173 But, as Koskenniemi argues, while this function may be 
served by show trials within domestic courts, show trials lack any didactic and symbolic function 
in international tribunals, for which there is no identity between the actors in the court and the 
injured community: “Every failure to prosecute is a scandal, every judgment too little to restore 
the dignity of the victims, and no symbolism persuasive enough to justify the drawing of the 
thick line between the past and the future.”
174 
The testimony of victims and civil parties is particularly important given the expressly 
didactic function of the ECCC. Amidst dry testimony concerning the provenance of documents 
or the personnel in Office 870, the testimony of the victims regarding their own injuries and the 
deaths of family members stands out.
175 In making the injuries concrete, the statements of 
victims generate possibilities for addressing the larger questions of justice that Arendt deems 
inaccessible to the law. But there is an inherent tension in that the civil parties do not necessarily 
want to merely describe their pain in ways that fit the format of the established trial; the need to 
maintain order at the trial has cabined the role of the civil parties to address their individual 
experiences in a way that may, in some sense, re-victimize them.
176 Mohan argues instead that 
“victim-centrism’s therapeutic goals would be better served by a new victimology rooted in 
inherently local conceptions of storytelling, art and ritual that avoid universalized narratives and 
deploy extra-legal ideas about mass atrocity in Cambodia.”
177 
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The civil parties are limited to “moral” and “collective” reparations,
178 and current 
proposals focus on education about the history of Democratic Kampuchea, memorials for the 
victims, and traveling exhibits to show physical artifacts from the period to people throughout 
Cambodia.
179 These efforts dovetail with those of local NGOs to teach Cambodian history — 
particularly as it relates to the DK era — to students.
180 This explicitly connects the possibility of 
justice for victims of the Khmer Rouge to the writing and transmission of history, based on 
ongoing scholarship. This kind of historical writing has one particular advantage over the history 
produced by the trial itself: it can be open-ended, subject to revision, and part of an ongoing 
conversation about accountability and justice in the wake of mass violence. As Martha Minow 
observes, ultimately “the truth-telling surrounding the struggles for reparations can alter attitudes 
more than the reparations themselves, yet the palpable symbolism of actual reparations will 
redeem those struggles in ways that all the narration and fact-gathering never could.”
181 
The preservation of the memory of the crimes of Democratic Kampuchea also serves as a 
backstop to combat revisionism. The record generated by the trial and preserved (and expanded 
upon) through the civil parties’ moral reparations gives a window, however imperfect, into some 
of the major crimes in this period and shows that they have been subjected to the formality of an 
adversarial criminal trial. Antonio Cassese noted that one function of the ICTY was to ensure 
that “In the years and decades to come, no one will be able to deny the depths to which their 
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brother and sister human beings sank.”
182 The same sentiment holds true in Cambodia, where 
many in the younger generation find it difficult to reconcile the stories that they hear from 
parents and grandparents with their understandings of human nature.
183 
A recurring challenge is that many individuals, and not only former Khmer Rouge, have 
no desire to re-open the wounds of the 1970s. Yet the wounds remain, often festering through the 
decades. The relationship of the past to the present remains in need of explication: whether the 
past must be confronted and interrogated,
184 or whether strategic forgetfulness and myth-making 
is necessary for the maintenance of transitional justice mechanisms.
185 This question has been 
addressed through the long attempt of post-war German intellectuals to understand how to 
confront their own past — a political and cultural context that is substantially dissimilar to that of 
contemporary Cambodia. While the lessons of Habermas,
186 Adorno,
187 et al. are probably not 
immediately transferable to the Cambodian context, it is important to bear in mind the tension 
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between perpetuating myths for the purpose of social stability and potentially explosive 
confrontations with the past.
188 
The danger of perpetuating mythology is the recapitulation and internalization of the 
state’s narrative. Even today, the function of the museum at S-21 is to “present a prepackaged, 
summarized, public version of events for view both by Khmer and by foreigners. It precisely 
collapses space and time in ways that Vickery labels distortions. In doing so, the museum 
provides an explanation for the inexplicable, and creates from death a reestablished sense of 
national identity.”
189 Judy Ledgerwood explains how, over time, the museum’s message gains 
power by both tapping into existing feelings of injustice and providing a frame that encourages 
the reinforcement of these messages. In time, “the writings [in the visitor book] echoed almost 
precisely the rhetoric of the state publications. Standardized phrases emerged. The message was: 
first, that Cambodians want to remember the criminal acts of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu 
Samphan clique …; and second, that the purpose of this remembering is to prevent the return of 
the Khmer Rouge to power.”
190 Memorialization can play an important role in providing 
immediacy to historical lessons that cannot be adequately replicated in texts alone. And yet, 
memorialization risks providing an easy escape from confrontation with deeper, systemic issues, 
such as class conflict, racial and religious tension, and deep-seated cultural myths. 
VI.  Conclusion: The ECCC as a Lesson in Hybridity 
This paper has argued that the ECCC has actively shaped the boundary between the legal 
mechanisms within the court and the broader issues of modern Cambodian history, as well as the 
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nature of the boundary itself. Maintaining the separation between the interior space of the law 
and the exterior space of Cambodian history is essential for several reasons, including the 
prevention of undue political influence on the legal process. However, this paper has also shown 
that this separation is never absolute — nor should it be. On the contrary, the legal process at the 
court is always steeped in the large issues of Cambodian history that give it meaning, and 
observers of the court recognize that it will play an important role in shaping extra-legal 
discussions of the Khmer Rouge period. This is straightforward. 
This blurring of the functions is only a problem because the legal norms that the court 
employs and the norms of historical inquiry are at odds in a very fundamental sense, owing to the 
clash between the pragmatic need for certitude and res judicata, and liberal open-endedness. We 
can see the defense counsel take two divergent approaches: Karnavas has tried to bring the 
testimony of historical experts (such as Chandler and Chhang) fully within the norms of legal 
discourse, which would rob them of their particular power to address wider issues. Pauw has 
instead tried to identify the larger historical issues that are implicit within the narrow scope of the 
trial in order to claim that the trial is structured to be unfair. Both of these approaches depend on 
the maintenance of a strict separation between law and history — what Latour calls the work of 
purification.
191 The Prosecution, by contrast, has used historical expertise as a window into the 
documentary and testimonial evidence, and has seen no particular problem that needs 
resolution.
192 The approach of the parties reflects the model of purification. 
The more interesting question is how the court deals with this tension. Osiel contrasts the 
Durkheimian approach, which seeks closure and consensus, with his model of “dissensus.” But 
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dissensus seems incompatible with the particular needs of the court to reach finality and to base 
conviction (particularly in a politically charged context) in robust fact-finding. In this conclusion, 
I suggest a middle path, which accepts the pragmatic need for closure in the legal judgment, 
while leaving open the possibility of dissensus in the larger historical discourse. Such an 
approach would draw attention to the work of boundary drawing and the necessary fiction of 
purification, and to the reasoning that informs how evidence is received in the first place. The 
approach would not seek greater factual precision in the judgment than the record allows, but 
neither would it shy away from the need to reach finality. By making explicit the constructedness 
of the legal reasoning, it simultaneously brings into the ambit of the court, while still keeping at 
arm’s length, the existence of extra-legal influences. I suggest that this would be superior to 
leaving them unaddressed. 
A.  The Work of Purification Draws Attention to Hybridity at the ECCC 
Consider the Nuon Chea team’s objection to Hun Sen’s statement that their client was a 
murderer.
193 Both the Trial Chamber and the Supreme Court Chamber affirmed that this 
statement carried no legal weight and would not affect the decision-making of the chamber. Of 
course, these guarantees only highlighted the omnipresent question of corruption at the court — 
why make the obvious point that the Prime Minister’s remark would not affect the legal process 
unless there was already pervasive suspicion that it would? By not addressing that — the specter 
of impropriety — this attempt to reinforce the purification of law and politics had the opposite 
effect. It is the inability to name the problem that constitutes the real challenge for the court. 
If these problems could be addressed directly (without having them swallow up the 
proceedings), it is possible that little would substantively change regarding the ongoing cases — 
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but the court would take the significant step of making its decisions about fact-finding more 
defensible. 
By framing the problem in this way, I follow Bruno Latour’s use of hybrid objects as 
challenging the conceptual separation of nature and society.
194 The hybrid legal/historical 
character of the record generated by the ECCC similarly challenges the separation of law and 
history described above. But, just as Latour attempts to find a new ontology in the collapse of 
purification (rather than retreating into either total constructivism or naïve realism), so too this 
focus on hybridity avoids the Scylla of law-as-pure-politics and the Charybdis of naïve-legal-
formality. 
B.  The Possibility of Justice Cannot be Grounded in Absolute Purification 
The ultimate lesson of the ECCC is that a court in its situation — politically 
compromised and within a society lacking robust legal institutions or expertise — cannot provide 
the same presumption of fairness that is upheld as an ideal. It is simply not structured in a way 
that could do so, whatever its judges may say. But to use this to rule out ex ante the possibility of 
creating a body like the ECCC would rule out the possibility of law within many transitional 
societies which similarly lack mechanisms to ensure fairness. It would formalize impunity — 
itself a heightened form of injustice. 
By contrast, a court in a transitional society could acknowledge the problems that it faces 
and then do the best work that it can, given those constraints. This would not excuse the lapses 
from the ideals of legality that would occur — the maintenance of a pure legal space remains a 
worthwhile ideal — but neither would it make a fetish out of certain legal protections that are not 
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necessarily attainable in our societies either, as a tradition of legal theory from the Realists 
through critical legal studies has taught us. Rather than requiring justice to be binary — either 
fully present or not at all — we can try to use the experience of the ECCC to understand the form 
of justice taken by this imperfect vehicle. 
This echoes an argument made by Guyora Binder to rebut the charge that human rights 
law is an imposition of Western cultural imperialism. As he notes, “Why does the legitimacy of 
international human rights law depend upon the possibility of establishing universal moral truths? 
We do not usually place such a heavy burden of proof on domestic legal regimes.”
195 His 
solution to this dilemma is to reframe the question in a more pragmatic way: “we should ask how 
human rights law contributes to building decent and democratic societies in a developing world 
suspended between local and global cultural structures.”
196 However, creating a system of human 
rights law that contributes to such a project requires more than autonomous institutions and 
initiatives; the discourse of human rights must be woven into the fabric of domestic and 
international legal and extralegal systems.
197 Binder’s solution reflects the necessity of linking 
the legal project of the Khmer Rouge tribunal to the development of robust domestic legal norms 
and of framing the development of human rights as part of an ongoing process. 
C.  Acknowledging Hybridity Need Not Taint the Work of Historian or Judge 
The ECCC has experienced more than its share of political interference. It may seem 
perverse to suggest that the relaxation of legal ideals can improve this court. But the point is not 
to excuse these lapses — merely to acknowledge that in the context of transitional justice they 
will always be present. There are fundamental trade-offs to be made in having an 
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internationalized tribunal to address mass atrocity under weak domestic laws. Recognition of this 
fact allows for honesty in assessing how such tribunals operate. 
Hybridity may be an important starting point in dealing with problems that inevitably 
transcend issues of law and of history. Faced with mass atrocities that rend the fabric of a society 
and have deep historical and cultural roots, historical scholarship without legal accountability 
may be empty, while law without historical expertise is blind. The magnitude of the crimes of 
Democratic Kampuchea demands a full accounting that transcends what either history or law can 
do alone. But the two cannot be presumed to operate in tandem; legal fact-finding can do 
violence to history, even as historical understanding can lead to the evasion of tough findings of 
accountability. Hybridity allows for the recognition of this tension, and of our inability to fully 
address either side of the division. 
The failures of the ECCC thus bring with them an important lesson on the limits of law. 
Between the recognized failure in having Pol Pot escape a full accounting by dying in the jungle, 
and the recognized failure of legality in the 1979 Vietnamese show trial, in which the defense 
counsel for Pol Pot and Ieng Sary described them as “criminally insane monsters,”
198 the 
perceived failures of the ECCC may nevertheless represent a modest outcome for a bad situation. 
In castigating the ECCC for failing to live up to Western norms of legality, we ought to be wary 
of reifying a fictive vision of legal absolutism. 
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